














The Road Ahead:  
































The Road Ahead:  










   
         ight there be gaps in the international rules governing cyber conflict, 
and if so, are they likely to be filled? Is this the right way to think about 
these questions?   
Whether gaps exist in international law seems at first to be a technical, 
almost marginal issue. On analysis, however, the question1 emerges as one 
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versity. © 2012 by Michael J. Glennon. This paper draws upon The Dark Future of Cyber-
Security Regulation, 6 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND POLICY 563 (2012). I 
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1. The literature on the broader question of lacunae and non liquets in international law 
is neither new nor thin. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 92–93 (5th ed. 
2003); Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of International Law, in INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 153 
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999); Ole Spiermann, Lotus and 
the Double Structure of International Legal Argument, in id. at 131; Prosper Weil, “The Court Can-
not Conclude Definitively . . .”: Non Liquet Revisited, 36 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNA-













that goes to the very “source of validity of international law,” rather in the 
manner that questions posed by quantum mechanics go to the heart of the 
physical structure of the universe.2 Nowhere are the issues more urgent or 
far-reaching than in the realm of cyber war.  
Press reports about Stuxnet3 and related activities suggest the unease 
with which cyber activities fit within the framework of existing rules. Was 
“Olympic Games,” the covert operation in which Stuxnet was employed, a 
use of force within Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter? Did Olym-
pic Games constitute an “armed attack” under Article 51―which would 
have permitted defensive use of force by Iran against the United States and 
Israel? Is this an international armed conflict governed by international 
humanitarian law? Is the United States unlawfully using civilians in com-
bat―or are the persons at the keyboards combatants because they are di-
rectly participating in hostilities? If so, who are the combatants? The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency’s computer staff? The officer who pushed the “en-
ter” button? Does it matter whether they fail to “carry arms openly” or 
wear a “fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance”?4 Can they be 







                                                                                                                      
Community, 35 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124 (1959); Hersch Lauter-
pacht, Some Observations on the Prohibition of “Non Liquet” and the Completeness of the Law, in 
SYMBOLAE VERZIJL 196 (Marinus Mijhoff ed., 1958), reprinted in 2 HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 213 (Elihu Lau-
terpacht ed., 1975); John Dickinson, The Problem of the Unprovided Case, UNIVERSITY OF 
PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW 115 (1932). 
2. See Stone, supra note 1, at 125. 
3. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, 
NEW YORK TIMES, June 1, 2012, at A1. 
4. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Prisoners of War Convention]. 
5. Similar questions arise in connection with drone strikes. See Gary Solis, America’s 
Unlawful Combatants, WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 12, 2010, at A17. For thoughtful considera-
tion of whether gaps exist in the rules governing detention during conflicts with non-State 
groups, see John B. Bellinger III & Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Detention Operations in Contem-
porary Conflicts: Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law, 105 AMERI-












II. THE ILLUSION OF COMPLETENESS 
 
Some of the articles in this volume and much general commentary6 suggest 
that the jus ad bellum and jus in bello rules that might address such questions 
contain no gaps. The assumption appears to be that the rules are compre-
hensive, comprising categories like squares on a huge juridical quilt that 
covers every possible fact situation and leaves no legal question unan-
swered. The implication is that only one correct answer exists for every 
such question,7 since a complete system would leave no room for multiple, 
equally correct, conflicting answers to the same question. Finding the cor-
rect answer is merely a matter of accurate classification: identify the charac-
teristics of the activity in question, and then place it neatly within the ap-
propriate legal category. That there exist gray areas on the margins of each 
category makes classification more difficult but does not defeat it. The right 
answer is out there, waiting to be discovered, embedded in “community 
values,”8 earlier rules,9 their overarching purposes or some other juridically 
endogenous source that transcends humanity’s fleeting differences. Good 
lawyers everywhere ultimately will come to the same correct conclusion as 
to how ambiguities should be resolved and which category is the right one. 
The analytic process is thus a logical sequence of binary choices: something 
like Stuxnet is either a use of force or not a use of force, an attack or not an 
attack, armed or not armed, perpetrated by combatants or noncombatants, 
and so on. Categories like these have a clear core; if judges can identify that 
core, the rest of us can as well. Find it, make the right choice at each step, 
                                                                                                                      
6. For representative recent writings, see TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATION-
AL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE (Michael N. Schmitt ed., forthcoming 2013), 
draft available at http://issuu.com/nato_ccd_coe/docs/tallinn_manual_draft/1#share. 
7. For an argument along these lines, see “Judge Hercules’” ability to identify the one 
right answer in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986) (“I must try to exhibit [the] 
complex structure of legal interpretation, and I shall use for that purpose an imaginary 
judge of superhuman intellectual power and patience who accepts law as integrity. Call 
him Hercules.”). 
8. Community-values adherents typically flesh out the concept with reliance upon no-
tions such as security, human dignity, social progress, quality of life and self-determination. 
Cf. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 128 (referring to “the idea that all the materials which enter 
into the construction of a new legal rule for an unprovided case must themselves be law”).  
9. See id. at 118 (“The notion that legal rules are so connected rationally that one can 
be deduced from others leads to the conclusion that in the last analysis there is no such 
thing as an unprovided case. . . . [T]he law for new cases is to be found inside the law itself 














work through an idealized, neatly deduced decision tree and a single, accu-
rate conclusion will appear. 
This view has obvious attractions. It eliminates the specter of a “legal 
vacuum” from which, it is supposed, believers in the rule of law ought nat-
urally to recoil. It promises a Holy Grail of universality, the glimmering 
possibility that good intentions and assiduous effort will yield unanimity. It 
eradicates analytic confusion by giving every legal problem a crystalline an-
swer. It provides emotional succor to those who seek refuge from the be-
wildering tangle of conflicting wants, needs and emotions that spring from 
cultural, political and philosophical differences. It removes the perilous 
possibility that a non-existent gap in the law might be claimed by water-
boarders and their ilk as a pretext for violation. It gives judges an airtight 
rationale for deciding every case without trenching upon legislative or sov-
ereign prerogatives, as the case may be, since adjudication always entails 
interpreting existing rules rather than making new ones. It counters the 
growing problem of fragmentation in the international system. And it elim-
inates the frustrating need to come to consensus on new rules: if no gaps 
need be filled, no new rules need be devised. For lawyers puzzling over the 
rules that govern cyber war, cyber attacks, cyber defense and the like, this 
view of law is beguiling.  
It has but one drawback—it doesn’t deliver on its promises.  
It’s the wrong way to think about international law generally and the 
wrong way to think about the law of armed conflict in particular. The ap-
proach has been rejected by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)10 and 
dismissed by legal scholars for over a hundred years as arid formalism, legal 
fundamentalism, noble dreams, mechanical jurisprudence, mythmaking and 
various other pejoratives11―for understandable reasons. 
                                                                                                                      
10. See infra notes 34–35. 
11. In Germany, formalism was critiqued by Philip Heck and other proponents of a 
“jurisprudence of interests.” See Philip Heck, The Jurisprudence of Interests: An Outline, in THE 
JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERESTS 31 (M. Magdalena Schoch ed. & trans., 1948). In France, 
François Gény argued that formal legal sources were inadequate to address all legal ques-
tions. See FRANÇOIS GÉNY, MÉTHODE D’INTERPRÉTATION ET SOURCES EN DROIT PRIVÉ 
POSITIF (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1963); Richard Groshut, The Free Scientific Search of 
François Gény, 17 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF JURISPRUDENCE 14 (1972). In the United States, 
legal realists pressed for greater attention to the consequences that categories produced, 
suggesting the propriety of “rule skepticism” and “fact skepticism” in the classification 
process. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUS-












Think back to the earliest years, the years in which the law of armed 
conflict was young and rules were few. Did these pioneering, stand-alone 
rules leave no gaps? The few early rules were isolated patches; the “quilt” 
of international humanitarian law, such as it is, emerged only gradually, 
over many years.12 In the initial years of the law’s development, numerous 
matters that were later to be addressed by the rules remained uncovered.13 
At what point in the law’s evolution did it become all-encompassing, leav-
ing no question unanswered, like the rules of chess? At what point did hu-
man imagination freeze, losing all capacity to exploit ambiguities in the ex-
isting rules? When, precisely, did the law’s development end? With the 
Hague Convention of 1899,14 or 1907?15 With the four 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions?16 With the additional protocols of 1979?17 When did the system 
become complete? How would we know if it were complete? 
At regular historical intervals, of course, general, prophylactic principles 
(such as the Martens clause, discussed later) did emerge, the ultimate im-
port of which was undifferentiated humanitarianism. Unless one takes 
some form of moral intuition as transforming itself inexorably into legal 
                                                                                                                      
LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 474 (1934); Roscoe Pound, The Ideal Element in American Judicial 
Decision, 45 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 136 (1931).  
12. See generally JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMER-
ICAN HISTORY (2012); see also GARY B. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 3–10 (2010). 
13. See Dickinson, supra note 1, at 116 (“In the seventeenth and the early part of the 
eighteenth century, when many of the lines of our present legal processes were laid down, 
it is fair to say that the problem of the unprovided case was taken for granted and not 
clearly envisaged as a problem at all.”).  
14. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803. 
15. Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 
1907, 36 Stat. 2227. 
16. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for 
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of 
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Prisoners of War 
Convention, supra note 4; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-













rules,18 however, precepts that mandate unspecified altruism can hardly be 
considered sufficient to obviate the need for additional, more particularized 
squares on the legalist quilt, such as, for example, prohibitions against the 
use of dumdum bullets or noxious gases. These specific prohibitions and 
myriad others like them were considered necessary precisely because gener-
alized exhortations to good conduct left room for reasonable disagreement 
as to what was expected. No evidence exists to suggest that the law has ar-
rived—or ever will arrive—at some millennial zenith beyond which no fur-
ther refinement need be contemplated. Evolving human wants, needs and 
emotions will continue to produce the ever-changing mishmash of clash-
ing, culturally variant preferences from which international law flows.19 
Nor, for that matter, is there any reason to believe that further legaliza-
tion would necessarily be a good thing. Concerns about “law-free zones” 
take as the starting point that legal regulation is better than no legal regula-
tion. But this is not always true; whether a “legal vacuum” is desirable de-
pends upon the alternative and the law’s effects. African captives on a nine-
teenth-century slave ship would not likely have hailed international law’s 
prohibition against visitation of the vessel and release of its human cargo as 
filling a welcome gap in customary rules governing the slave trade.20 It is 
not self-evident that a rule classifying Stuxnet as an armed attack ultimately 
would promote international peace or security. Compared with the alterna-
                                                                                                                      
18. For a comment on Michael Walzer’s effort to apply his notion of “practical mo-
rality” to war, see Michael J. Glennon, Pre-empting Proliferation: International Law, Morality, and 
Nuclear Weapons, 23 EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ___ (forthcoming 
2012). Though much of the formalism that pervades international humanitarian law can be 
attributed to surviving ghosts of a naturalist worldview, additional forces are at play, in-
cluding the influence in Europe of a civil law tradition with purportedly comprehensive 
codes, and, in the United States, the continued emphasis on appellate cases in legal educa-
tion, implying no need to examine exogenous, contextual sources to predict case out-
comes. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44 
HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1222 (1931). The oft-repeated claim that “we are all realists now” 
has yet to embrace all within international law’s “invisible college.” 
19. Prosper Weil put it well: 
 
Regardless of the judicial and scholarly endeavors to affirm the completeness of 
international law, the truth of the matter is that international law is not complete. No legal 
order is, because there is not, cannot be, and should not be a rule at hand for every 
concrete or new situation. . . . More than municipal law, international law is by its very 
nature riddled with gaps. 
 
Weil, supra note 1, at 118. 
20. See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 (1825). See generally Jean Allain, Nineteenth 
Century Law of the Sea and the British Abolition of the Slave Trade, 78 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF 












tive of airstrikes, Stuxnet probably was cheaper and more effective, risked 
no casualties, might have averted a major war, and―at least until its spon-
sorship was leaked―set no untoward precedent. Would that legal regulation 
could always do so well: less, in the legal realm, sometimes is more. 
Consider closely the analogical process involved in classifying Stuxnet 
and other cyber weapons and it becomes apparent that categorization in-
volves much more subjectivity than the formalists suggest. The circum-
stances that led to an old rule’s creation can be similar in some respects to 
current circumstances but different in others; which elements take priority? 
There exists no objective standard by which to identify the characteristics 
of an act or thing that are salient for classification purposes, or how much 
weight one characteristic is to be given relative to another, or the level of 
generality or particularity with which they are to be stated, or whether in-
strumentalities or effects are dispositive.21 One often can pull the accordion 
                                                                                                                      
21. NATO States have consistently argued, for example, that the UN Charter limits 
only harm caused by traditional instrumentalities―weapons―rather than cutoffs of foreign 
aid, trade boycotts, economic sanctions or other activities that might have the same con-
sequences as an armed attack. Matthew Waxman has concisely summarized the traditional 
understanding: 
 
The dominant view in the United States and among its major allies has long been that the 
Article 2(4) prohibition of force and the complementary Article 51 right of self-defense 
apply to military attacks or armed violence. The plain meaning of the text supports this 
view, as do other structural aspects of the U.N. Charter. For example, the Charter’s 
preamble sets out the goal that “armed force . . . not be used save in the common 
interest.” Similarly, Articles 41 and 42 authorize, respectively, the Security Council to take 
actions not involving armed force and, should those measures be inadequate, to escalate 
to armed force. Moreover, Article 51 speaks of self-defense against “armed” attacks. 
There are textual counter-arguments, such as that Article 51’s more specific limit to 
“armed attacks” suggests that drafters envisioned prohibited “force” as a broader category 
not limited to particular methods. However, the discussions of means throughout the 
Charter and the document’s negotiating history strongly suggest the drafters’ intention to 
regulate armed force differently and more strictly than other coercive instruments. This 
interpretation has generally prevailed over alternatives. . . . 
 
Matthew Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of Article 2(4), 36 
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 421, 427–28 (2011) (footnotes omitted).  See also 
Duncan B. Hollis, Why States Need an International Law for Information Operations, 11 LEWIS & 
CLARK LAW REVIEW 1023, 1040–42 (2007). The State Department Legal Adviser, howev-
er, has indicated that “if the physical consequences of a cyber attack work the kind of 
physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would, that cyber attack should 
equally be considered a use of force.” Harold Hongju Koh, Remarks at the U.S. Cyber 
Command Inter-Agency Legal Conference: International Law in Cyberspace (Sept. 18, 
2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/09/19/harold-koh-on-international-law-in-
cyberspace/. Why actual physical damage should be required to bring an activity within 













of analogy wide or push it tightly together without risk of being proven 
wrong.22 Much the same can be said of efforts to establish the law’s com-
pleteness and continuousness through reliance upon supposed community 
values and underlying purposes. The assertion that community values con-
cerning use of force are “shared” is belied by extensive international opin-
ion polling,23 as well as State practice and opinio juris.24 To the extent that 
consensus does exist, it must be formulated at so high a level of generality 
and embrace so many different values, policies and political preferences as 
to support multiple, equally compelling and sometimes conflicting conclu-
sions. These can be overcome only by presupposing an international con-
sensus that does not now exist and never did exist.25 Thus formalist analysis 
easily becomes outcome oriented, producing, in the words of Hersch Lau-
terpacht, a “deceptive clarity”: 
 
[A]pparent indecision [by the International Court of Justice] . . . 
may―both as a matter of development of the law and as a guide to 
action―be preferable to a deceptive clarity which fails to give an 
indication of the inherent complexities of the issue. 
  
In so far as the decisions of the Court are an expression of existing 
international law―whether customary or conventional―they cannot but 
reflect the occasional obscurity or inconclusiveness of a defective legal 
system.26 
 
                                                                                                                      
ploying chemical or biological agents would seemingly constitute a use of force notwith-
standing the absence of physical consequences. If the physical consequences of economic 
sanctions or trade boycotts cause physical damage, ought they too to be considered a use 
of force? 
22. For discussion of the levels-of-generality problem in customary law, see MICHAEL 
J. GLENNON, LIMITS OF LAW, PREROGATIVES OF POWER: INTERVENTIONISM AFTER KO-
SOVO 50–52 (2001). 
23. See Glennon, supra note 18.  
24. See generally GLENNON, supra note 22. 
25. Advance Questions for Lieutenant General Keith Alexander, USA, Nominee for 
Commander, United States Cyber Command: Before the S. Armed Services Comm., 111th 
Cong. 11 (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/ 
04%20April/Alexander%2004-15-10.pdf (“There is no international consensus on a pre-
cise definition of a use of force, in or out of cyberspace. Consequently, individual nations 
may assert different definitions, and may apply different thresholds for what constitutes a 
use of force.”). Compare Koh, supra note 21. 
26. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 












False claims of clarity aimed at concealing the obscurity and inconclu-
siveness of legal rules that might or might not apply to hard cases generate 
only incoherence. What make hard cases hard is their incommensurability 
and our inability to devise objective criteria that render them commensura-
ble.27 In fact, as Hart wrote, “[s]uch cases are not merely ‘hard cases’”; the 
problem is that “the law in such cases is fundamentally incomplete: it pro-
vides no answer to the questions at issue in such cases.”28 
Some insist that, because legal categories have a clear core, the interna-
tional legal system is not “defective” at all and that ostensible gaps disap-
pear. Even assuming that the category in question does have a clear core, 
however, it is ambiguity at the margins that produces gaps―gaps that disap-
pear only if it’s assumed that every ambiguity is in the end spurious and has 
a single, correct resolution, or that nothing but law goes into the making 
and interpretation of law, or that a relevant, pre-existing rule always twin-
kles like some far-off star exerting emanations from a penumbra that light 
up the one correct answer. Yet how, again, do we know this? Sometimes 
the galaxy seems empty; other times the galaxy seems to contain equally 
radiant stars. The formalists present no standard to assess which star is 
brighter, insisting only that one must be brighter and that reasonable people 
must come to the same, unfalsifiable outcome. But legal rules are not like 
stars. They don’t emit luminosity that can be measured.29 We have only the 
naked eye to judge their proximity. Rules are made up, created by human 
beings. Sometimes, but not always, they’re given a specified priority as 
against other rules, as in the case of constitutional rules versus statutes. But 
even then, the nearest rules can be so remote in time, subject, or specificity 
as to generate honest doubt about their applicability.30 Conflicts can arise 
                                                                                                                      
27. See John Finnis, On Reason and Authority in Law’s Empire, 6 LAW AND PHILOSO-
PHY 357 (1987). 
28. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 252 (2d ed. 1997) (emphases in original). 
29. For the suggestion that normativity exists in gradations, see Prosper Weil, Towards 
Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
413 (1983). 
30. General, elastic norms are sometimes considered principles rather than rules. 
Rules are more specific, less malleable and cover less. Rules were described by Pound as 
“precepts attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a definite, detailed state of 
facts.” Roscoe Pound, Hierarchy of Sources and Forms in Different Systems of Law, 7 TULANE 
LAW REVIEW 475, 482 (1933). Principles, in contrast, are more general and constitute “au-
thoritative starting points for legal reasoning, employed continually and legitimately where 
cases are not covered or are not fully or obviously covered by rules in the narrower sense.” 
Id. at 483. Pound thus regarded principles as “hortatory.” Roscoe Pound, For the “Minority 













among rules of the same priority, efforts to reconcile the rules can fail, rea-
sonable disagreement can arise as to which prevails, and a court can fairly 
resolve the controversy either way31―or can decline to resolve the contro-
versy at all in the belief that its writ does not extend to rulemaking. The 
word that describes such a situation is gap. 
Nor is it an answer to say that gaps don’t exist because judges fill the 
gaps. Whether gaps exist and whether judges should fill them are different 
questions. Of course judges can sometimes fill the gaps; whether they may 
do so depends upon the authority given them by the specific legal system 
in which they sit.32 When the law yields no answer, judges not infrequently 
find themselves asked, in effect, to decide on the basis of personal politics 
or philosophy33―as they declined to do in the Nuclear Weapons advisory 
opinion, where the ICJ (not for the first time)34 acknowledged a gap of ex-
                                                                                                                      
skeptical of their utility. When on the Supreme Court, he invited his fellow justices to 
name any legal principle on which they relied, suggesting that he could show them how it 
could be used to decide the case under consideration either way. See LOUIS MENAND, THE 
METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 340 (2004). Principles concerning 
the meaning of sovereignty, such as the sovereign equality of States, non-intervention and 
related concepts, do cover gaps and might presage future cyber rules, but they’re not con-
crete enough to resolve categorization problems that flow from rules, and some principles 
have been ignored so often by so many States that their vitality is questionable. Non-
intervention is an example. See Peter Ackerman & Michael J. Glennon, Building Liberty: The 
Right Side of the Law, AMERICAN INTEREST (Sept.–Oct. 2007), http://www.the-american-
interest.com/article.cfm?piece=313; GLENNON, supra note 22. 
31. See generally JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE 
THEORY OF LAW AND PRACTICAL REASON 11 (2009) (“[W]e cannot expect the law of any 
one country to have a uniform way of demarcating the boundary between what belongs to 
it and what lies outside of it, let alone expect to find that all legal systems demarcate the 
boundary in the same way.”). 
32. The Supreme Court appeared to identify the point at which indeterminacy pushes 
law interpreting into lawmaking in the seminal political question case of Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962), where it found itself barred from deciding a question that involved “a 
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibil-
ity of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial dis-
cretion. . . .” Id. at 217. Such questions are non-justiciable, it seems, because a gap in the 
law precludes their resolution. 
33. “In these cases it is clear,” H.L.A. Hart wrote, “that the rule-making authority 
must exercise discretion, and there is no possibility of treating the question raised by the 
various cases as if there were one uniquely correct answer to be found, as distinct from an 
answer which is a reasonable compromise between many conflicting interests.” HART, 
supra note 28, at 132. 
34. See, for example, Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain) (Second 












actly the sort here at issue.35 Some legal systems are hospitable to judges’ 
making up rules in such circumstances;36 others are not.37  Legal systems 
draw different lines between law interpreting and law creating. Some judges 
acknowledge the distinction; others do not.38 In any event, in the first in-
stance and sometimes in the last―before the judges intervene, and when 
judges won’t intervene―lawyers must look to their own judgment to advise 
                                                                                                                      
not established its own rules” concerning “the rights of states with regard to the treatment 
of companies and shareholders”; Haya de la Torre (Colom. v. Peru), 1951 I.C.J. 71, 80 (June 
13), in which the Court stated that the applicable law did not “give a complete answer” to 
the asylum question at issue; and Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua 
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 135 (June 27), in which the Court, addressing the question 
whether international law placed restrictions on a State’s military arsenal, declared that “in 
international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State 
concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State 
can be limited.” 
35. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 105(2)(E) (July 8). The specific issue on which the Court was unable to reach a con-
clusion concerned whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or un-
lawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State 
would be at stake. Judge Vereshchetin wrote separately that in an advisory proceeding that 
presents such a lacuna, the Court “ought merely to state this” and “cannot be blamed for 
indecisiveness or evasiveness where the law . . . is itself inconclusive.” Id. at 280. Judge 
Higgins, on the other hand, wrote separately to emphasize that applicable norms “indubi-
tably exist” and that “the judge’s role is precisely to decide which of two or more compet-
ing norms is applicable in the particular circumstances.” Id. at 592.  
36. See generally Stone, supra note 1. In Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 
(1964), the United States Supreme Court was urged to decide the case on the merits be-
cause, it was argued, “United States courts could make a significant contribution to the 
growth of international law, a contribution whose importance, it is said, would be magni-
fied by the relative paucity of decisional law by international bodies.” Id. at 434. The Court 
declined the invitation. “[G]iven the fluidity of present world conditions,” it concluded, 
“the effectiveness of such a patchwork approach toward the formulation of an acceptable 
body of law concerning State responsibility for expropriations is, to say the least, highly 
conjectural.” Id. 
37. It is notable that the jurisdictional grant of the International Court of Justice di-
rects it not to decide all disputes as are submitted to it, but “to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it” (Statute of the International Court of 
Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993 (emphasis added)), sug-
gesting that a gap in international law would require judicial abstention. 
38. One ought to be skeptical, Hart urged, about “ritual language used by judges” 
who claim to be “the mere ‘mouthpiece’ of the law which [they] do not make or mold.” 
HART, supra note 28, at 274. Prominent jurists such as Holmes, Cardozo and respected 
Law Lords have recognized that there are “cases left incompletely regulated by the law,” 
cases in which judges have an “inescapable” lawmaking task, and that “many cases could 













clients, and lawmakers must look to their own judgment to decide whether 
existing rules are adequate.39 The rejoinder that a single correct answer 
awaits them, if only they have the wits to find it, is a conclusion, not an ar-
gument―and it is moreover a conclusion that, again, defies falsification (for 
no counterexample can be hypothesized that could show that no such an-
swer exists). 
All this applies with particular force to international law. International 
law does not present a neat sequence of straightforward binary choices be-
tween “A” and “Not A.” Junctures that the formalists regard as forks along 
the way in fact present a third choice: neither “A” nor “Not A.” The third 
choice is “No law.” At these junctures, the category in question doesn’t 
seem quite right, but rejecting that category doesn’t seem entirely right ei-
ther. These are questions on which the law is either non-existent or un-
clear, but the result is the same: reasonable people can differ. 
Contrary to the formalists’ fears, however, acknowledging ambiguity 
doesn’t open the door to a law-free zone, because international law applies 
a default rule in such circumstances. Its default rule is the famous freedom 
principle, from the Lotus case.40 The principle has it that in the absence of a 
rule a State is deemed free to act, and that a burden of persuasion falls up-
on the State that alleges some limitation or restriction on another State’s 
freedom of action. The formalists are, perversely, in this sense right that 
there are no gaps in the international legal order; what would otherwise be 
a gap is filled with the rule that a State is free to act unless some other State 
has shown that the acting State has consented to a restriction or limitation 
on its freedom of action. This possibility of a third option in resolving a 
dispute concerning the applicability of a category is more than a kind of 
                                                                                                                      
39. Keeping the rules alive by adding more fine print, judicially or legislatively, may 
seem at first blush like moving toward a more complete system with fewer ambiguities. In 
fact, more rules can lead to more gaps, not fewer, as when the law specifies new categories 
to which rules apply but says nothing about categories not specified, implying expressio unius 
est exclusio alterius. 
40. The words of the Permanent Court of International Justice in Lotus are worth re-
calling: 
 
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding 
upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by 
usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and established in order to 
regulate the relations between these co-existing independent communities or with a view 
to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the independence of States 
cannot therefore be presumed. 
 












juridical afterthought, invented for dealing with legal uncertainty. The third 
option, the freedom principle, is an affirmation of State sovereignty that 
encapsulates the foundational architecture of the international legal order.  
The Lotus’s notion that the system is wholly consent based is, in the 
end, simplistic, in the sense that the international legal order is hardly de-
void of coercion. The system does not rest upon pure, unfettered consent 
by all within it; policymakers within States often do things that they don’t 
want to do and refrain from doing things that they do want to do. Other 
States, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
influential national elites all exercise various forms of power; all narrow 
States’ ability to choose freely. The difference between the international 
legal system and domestic legal systems lies, rather, in the immediacy, 
source, extent and consequences of coercion, and the structure of incen-
tives or disincentives that results. If the notion of consent that the interna-
tional order pictures is taken as a form of constructive rather than actual 
consent, however, the freedom principle provides a useful shorthand that 
emphasizes basic structural differences.41 
Whatever the conceptual difficulties with the notion of consent, it re-
mains true that unless a restriction is established, a State remains free to 
act. Universalists dislike the notion that anything not prohibited is permit-
ted, for holding out as it does the ever-present possibility that a State might 
defeat universality by declining to consent to a rule or by later withdrawing 
its consent. One effort in the realm of international humanitarian law to 
supplant the freedom principle with a form of natural law has been to use 
the Martens clause to overcome the hurdle of State non-consent. The 
clause in various iterations appears in a number of international humanitar-
ian instruments. One of the most recent and prominent versions is set out 
in Article 1(2) of Additional Protocol I, which provides as follows: “In cas-
es not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civil-
ians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the 
principles of international law derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.”42 The ar-
gument is that the Martens clause, as customary international law, carves 
out an exception to the freedom principle by imposing limitations on States 
to which they have not consented.  
                                                                                                                      
41. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, THE FOG OF LAW: PRAGMATISM, SECURITY, AND IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 17–18, 33, 64–65 (2010). 













This argument is unconvincing. The clause is not a one-sentence cure-
all that forever resolves all future legal ambiguities that might be created by 
technological innovation.43 Assuming that the Martens clause does consti-
tute customary international law44―which may not be the view of the Unit-
ed States45―it’s doubtful whether States such as the United States have 
consented to that rule outside of specific treaties in which it exists,46 and 
more doubtful still that the vague terms of the clause47 necessarily have the 
                                                                                                                      
43. See generally David Friedman, Does Technology Require New Law?, 25 HARVARD 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 71 (2001). 
44. In its advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, the ICJ 
said that the clause “had proved to be an effective means of addressing rapid evolution of 
military technology,” 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 78 (July 8), and that it represents customary inter-
national law. Id., ¶ 84. 
45. In 1987, the Deputy Legal Adviser of the U.S. State Department, Michael J. 
Matheson, identified those provisions of Additional Protocol I that the United States con-
siders customary international law. Article 1(2) was not among them. See Michael J. Mathe-
son, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols 
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND POLICY 419, 425 (1987). “No retreat from or disavowal of the Mathe-
son announcement has been issued by any branch or department of the U.S. govern-
ment.” SOLIS, supra note 12, at 134 n.68. For an indication that the United States interprets 
the clause merely as recognition of the continued validity of customary rules that have not 
been modified by treaty, see BURRUS M. CARNAHAN, CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, REPORT ON THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 6-2 
(1997) (prepared for the International Committee of the Red Cross). 
46. The United States has declined to ratify Additional Protocol I. Matheson, speak-
ing in his official capacity, said as follows: 
 
First, the United States will consider itself legally bound by the rules contained in Protocol 
I only to the extent that they reflect customary international law, either now or as it may 
develop in the future. . . . Second, Protocol I now cannot serve in itself as the baseline for 
the establishment of common rules to govern the operations of military alliances in which 
United States forces participate. . . . Third, Protocol I cannot now be looked to by actual 
or potential adversaries of the United States or its allies as a definitive indication of the 
rules that United States forces will observe in the event of armed conflict and will expect 
its adversaries to observe. . . . 
 
Matheson, supra note 45, at 420.  
47. Guidance prepared by the U.S. Department of the Army for military lawyers indi-
cated that the Martens clause “is difficult to apply in practice. Specific obligations resulting 
from the ‘laws of humanity . . .’ are extremely difficult to agree upon. . . . Such broad 
phrases in international law are in reality a reliance upon moral law and public opinion.” 













drastic effect of broadly negating the application of the freedom principle.48 
The United Kingdom argued as follows in Nuclear Weapons: 
  
While the Martens Clause makes clear that the absence of a specific treaty 
provision on the use of nuclear weapons is not, in itself, sufficient to 
establish that such weapons are capable of lawful use, the Clause does 
not, on its own, establish their illegality. The terms of the Martens Clause 
themselves make it necessary to point to a rule of customary international 
law which might outlaw the use of nuclear weapons. Since it is the 
existence of such a rule which is in question, reference to the Martens 
Clause adds little.49 
  
The same would apply to cyber weapons: it’s still necessary to point to 
an applicable rule, and a gap in the rules can exist. Nowhere in Nuclear 
Weapons does the ICJ suggest that the gap it identified is any less a gap be-
cause of the Martens clause. As the Court’s opinion indicates, international 
law can apply to a given matter even though it contains a gap.50 
None of this is to suggest that the international regime governing cyber 
operations is a blank slate. That the civilizing constraints of the law of war 
are not automatically eclipsed by technological innovation is the enduring 
reminder of the Martens clause. Clichéd but true, precepts of international 
law that have taken shape over centuries are the received wisdom of the 
                                                                                                                      
48. The Court had a chance to say that, if it had wanted to, in the Nuclear Weapons ad-
visory opinion, supra note 35, and was in effect invited by the General Assembly to revisit 
the Lotus decision, but it declined to do so. Waldemar Solf suggested that the meaning of 
the principles of humanity and dictates of public conscience referred to in the clause 
“must be accepted in the practice of the states,” suggesting that the clause―like any other 
treaty provision―has the effect of merely continuing in force pre-existing norms of cus-
tomary international law that are not rendered inoperable by the treaty’s application. Re-
marks of Professor Waldemar Solf, 2 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND POLICY 481, 483 (1987).  
49. Letter Dated 16 June 1995 from the Legal Adviser to the Foreign and Common-
wealth Office of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Together 
with Written Comments of the United Kingdom 48, filed in Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion (June 16, 1995), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/95/8802.pdf. 
50. Broad inapplicability, however, might merely be thought of as a broader gap; both 
connote ineffectuality but in different degrees. The notion of a law that applies but has no 
effect was famously derided by Anatole France. “The law,” he wrote, “in its majestic 
equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, 
and to steal bread.” ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 (LE LYS ROUGE) (Winifred 













ages, to be ignored by the digitally distracted at their peril. That interna-
tional law does not unequivocally proscribe unleashing a computer virus to 
destroy centrifuges by changing the rotational speed of their motors51 does 
not mean that it is irretrievably vague about using malware to bring down a 
civilian airliner by freezing its computerized avionics. 
Nor do I proffer any new answer to the dilemma of when law inter-
preting begins and lawmaking ends, about how the needs of the present 
ought to be reconciled with the commands of the past, about when the 
impulses of the living ought to defer to the designs of the dead. We are 
still, to paraphrase Martin Amis, dozens of Henkins away from answers to 
those questions. I do suggest that the old lawyers’ saying―Le mort saisit le vif, 
the dead grip the living―has it backward: the living grip the dead, in my 
view, not because they must but because holding fast to settled solutions is 
the best way to give law the predictability and stability it requires, to nail 
down what we regard as progress, and simply to save ourselves work. The 
urge to loosen that grip grows stronger with every “next big thing” in war-
fighting technology, however: “it is never enough to claim a country; it 
must be held. It must be held and made secure, every generation.”52 The 
claim that the law doesn’t reach their conduct will forever be made by scoff-
laws seeking to evade its reach. That claim is no less repugnant in the realm 
of cyber rules than elsewhere―but in cyber rules, as elsewhere, that claim 
must be considered, for in no realm can either lawgivers or law interpreters 
evade the command of the law to decide what the rules cover and what 
they do not. The response to a spurious assertion of a gap, therefore, is not 
to profess that gaps do not exist; the response is to assess whether a partic-
ular gap does exist and, if not, to enforce the law.  
The point, then, is that there is a difference between lawmaking and law 
interpreting; that however hard it is to disentangle the two, it’s possible that 
gaps in the law governing cyber conflict can exist; and that given that pos-
sibility, classification choices that often have been assumed to present neat 
dyads in fact present triads. Realistic choices, in international law as else-
                                                                                                                      
51. The State Department Legal Adviser appears to have implied that Olympic 
Games constituted a use of force because the physical consequences of the attack worked 
the same kind of physical damage that dropping a bomb or firing a missile would have. See 
Koh, supra note 21. “Cyber activities,” he added, “that proximately result in death, injury, or signifi-
cant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of force.” Id. (emphasis in original). Why proximate 
causation is required is not clear; under traditional analysis, kinetic activity that is the 
cause-in-fact of death, injury or significant destruction would likely be viewed as a use of 
force.  












where, entail more than mechanical, on/off, light-switch classification. Re-
alistic lawyers are skeptical of essentialist and foundationalist value claims.53 
Realistic lawyering reflects the genealogy of legal rules, the consequences of 
one interpretation versus another, the structure of incentives and disincen-
tives that a given interpretation would yield, the political and historical con-
text in which a legal issue arises, the expectations of the parties, the level of 
compliance that rules actually generate, and a variety of other matters none 
of which can be captured in neat interpretive algorithms as part of a robot-
ic exercise of categorization. Formalism leaves policymakers scratching 
their heads in puzzlement when pretended “outcomes” don’t actually flow 
from the forms, from the categories, from the rigorous syllogisms that 
formalist lawyers lay out for them; exclusive reliance upon the categories 
masks the real factors on which outcomes inevitably depend. A broader 
approach, which some have called pragmatism,54 doesn’t purport to be cer-
tain, universalist or complete. It acknowledges the law’s inevitable indeter-
minacy and inability to foresee, let alone resolve, every possible future case. 
It recognizes the inconvenient truth “that existing legal rules themselves 
can be understood only in the light of ideas and information drawn from 
outside law. . . .”55 It accepts the risk of phony assertions of gaps in the law 
as the price of keeping the law honest, alive and understandable. It coun-
sels against reliance upon past choices that are wrongly claimed to have 
eliminated the need for future choices.56 But it does identify, or at least tries 
to identify, what’s really at stake in legal disputes, whether old categories 
are up to the task of resolving those disputes, and where new categories 
might be needed. And it doesn’t stifle legal reform with specious claims of 
systemic completeness. 
  
III. THE IMPROBABILITY OF NEW LIMITS 
 
A better way of posing the question that I now proceed to address, there-
fore, is not “whether gaps in the international rules governing cyber con-
                                                                                                                      
53. GLENNON, supra note 41, at 5. 
54. For a contemporary version in this context, see id. For an earlier, and prescient, 
exploration of some of the same themes, see SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, ON THE DUTY 
OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO NATURAL LAW 108 (James Tully ed., Michael Sil-
verthorne trans., 1991) (1682).  
55. Dickinson, supra note 1, at 122. 













flicts are likely to be filled”; rather, the question is whether States are likely 
to consent to new law that limits their freedom to use cyber weapons.  
Law is a form of cooperation. Certain conditions normally exist when 
cooperative mechanisms like law emerge and function properly.57 Actors 
within the system, for example, are relatively equal. Future dealings are ex-
pected. Trust is high. A consensus exists concerning foundational values. 
The cost of non-cooperation is high. Individual and collective interests 
align. Underlying social norms reinforce legal norms. Free riders and trans-
gressors are easily spotted and penalized.  
For better or worse, however, these and other conditions necessary to 
promote the emergence and development of legalist constraints are not 
present in sufficient degree to support further international rules governing 
cyber conflict―any more than those conditions have been present, in the 
past, to support the emergence of rules governing clandestine or covert 
intelligence operations of which cyber activity normally is a part.  
When States are equal in capability, the imposition of legal limits freez-
es in no advantage or disadvantage. Because cyber capabilities are con-
cealed, however, relative capability becomes speculative, leaving States 
without the ability to evaluate beforehand the apparent advantages and dis-
advantages that new rules might reify.58 States will not regulate the pursuit 
of core security interests based upon speculation (hence the muted interna-
tional enthusiasm for Russia’s proposal for an international cyber weapons 
                                                                                                                      
57. Andrew Hurrell has noted that “fundamental differences in religion, social organi-
zation, culture and moral outlook . . . may block or, at least, complicate cooperative ac-
tion.” Andrew Hurrell, Power, Institutions, and the Production of Inequality, in POWER IN GLOB-
AL GOVERNANCE 33, 36 (Michael Barnett & Raymond Duvall eds., 2005). See generally 
Simon Maxwell, Why Cooperate? (paper distributed at Reforming the United Nations Once 
and for All, World Economic Forum, Davos, Switzerland (Jan. 23, 2004)) (on file with 
author); Sarah Gillinson, Why Cooperate? A Multi-Disciplinary Study of Collective Action (Over-
seas Development Institute, Working Paper No. 234, 2004), available at 
http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/2472.pdf. Seminal works in this area include CO-
OPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986); ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984); and ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: 
COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984).  
58. For similar analysis see Jack Goldsmith, Cybersecurity Treaties: A Skeptical View, in 
FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW 6 (Peter Berkowitz ed., 2011), 
available at http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_ 
Goldsmith.pdf (“Offensive cyber weapons are guarded secrets because knowledge about 
the weapon enables the building of defenses and because revelation about attack capabili-
ties would reveal a lot about exploitation capabilities.”). See also Jack Goldsmith, The New 












ban).59 For similar reasons, customary international rules on these issues are 
unlikely. Customary international law depends upon connecting dots of 
historical precedents that form patterns of practice, but States have been 
disinclined to talk publicly about cyber incidents in which they have been 
involved.  
When future dealings are expected, States confront a greater incentive 
to come up with a mutually advantageous rule, such as the UN Charter’s 
prohibition against non-defensive use of force. If, however, the sponsor of 
a cyber attack can’t be identified because sponsorship of the attack―or the 
attack itself―is concealed, as is often true of cyber attacks, then the future 
casts no shadow and no State need be concerned about future rewards or 
penalties; law can impose no punishment.  
More than anything else, however, it is this element of attributabil-
ity―the reciprocal ability to say “who did it”―that makes law work. When a 
transgressor can be identified, penalties can be assessed, and retaliation and 
deterrence are possible―and so is legal regulation. Attribution permits the 
target to assign responsibility. It provides the rules’ ultimate enforcement 
mechanism―the ever-present threat of retaliation and punishment. It 
therefore establishes compliance incentives. And attributability enables le-
gal recourse against transgressors, not only in the International Criminal 
Court and other international tribunals, but also in the domestic courts of 
nations that comply with their international obligation to investigate and 
prosecute war crimes. If cyber activity and its sponsor are concealed, how-
ever, and verification of compliance is impossible, so too is deterrence60 
and effective legal regulation. No verifiable international agreement can 
regulate the covert writing or storage of computer code useful for launch-
ing a clandestine cyber attack.  
Indeed, this single reciprocal condition―the ability of a target nation to 
identify and threaten assailants in one way or another―underpins the entire 
                                                                                                                      
59. See U.N. GAOR, Letter dated September 23, 1998 from the Permanent Repre-
sentative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations to the Secretary General con-
cerning Agenda Item 63, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/53/3 (Sept. 30, 1998). 
60. For commentary on deterrence in cyber conflict, see Patrick M. Morgan, Applica-
bility of Traditional Deterrence Concepts and Theory to the Cyber Realm, in COMMITTEE ON DE-
TERRING CYBERATTACKS, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROCEEDINGS OF A WORK-
SHOP ON DETERRING CYBERATTACKS: INFORMING STRATEGIES AND DEVELOPING OP-
TIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 55 (2010), available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record 
_id=12997&page=55; Mike McConnell, To win the cyber-war, look to the Cold War, WASH-













legal edifice that regulates armed conflict.61 The prohibition against aggres-
sion is empty absent an ability to ascertain the aggressor. The protection of 
noncombatants disappears unless the assailant is identifiable. The law of 
neutrality is meaningless absent an ability to identify a belligerent. The pos-
sibility of reprisal or self-defense evaporates absent an ability to know what 
nation to take measures against. The notion of command responsibility dis-
solves absent knowledge of who the commander is. In marginal instances 
States’ interests induce compliance with the law of war despite attribution 
difficulties; compliance sometimes can produce extrinsic benefits for the 
law-abiding, such as shortening conflicts or stabilizing post-conflict envi-
ronments even when adversaries flout the law of war. But the modern rules 
of war are effectively premised on attributability.  
Internationally, the reciprocal possibility of identification thus makes 
violence less likely because it exposes the attacker to risk in three ways. 
First, retaliation is possible. While the modern laws of war generally pro-
hibit reciprocal violation, in practice the vitality of those rules often has 
depended upon the threat of retaliation. It would not, for example, have 
been permissible under international law to use chemical weapons against 
Nazi Germany in response to its putative use of such weapons, but it is 
entirely plausible that Hitler exercised restraint because of the credible 
threat to do so by Roosevelt and Churchill.62 Second, the identification of 
transgressors makes remedial legal action possible. For States, penalties for 
charges of aggression or disproportionate and indiscriminate attacks, for 
example, can take the form of economic sanctions, reparations or other 
remedies, as Iraq discovered following its invasion of Kuwait.63 For indi-
viduals, acts perpetrated during periods of armed conflict that transgress 
the laws of war, such as targeting civilians or torturing adversaries, give rise 
                                                                                                                      
61. See James D. Murrow, When Do States Follow the Laws of War?, 101 AMERICAN PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW 559, 560 (2007) (describing the role of “reciprocal enforce-
ment” in “[c]ompliance with the laws of war”).  
62. President Franklin D. Roosevelt warned that any use of poisonous or noxious 
gases by the enemy would be met by the “fullest possible retaliation”: 
 
[T]here have been reports that one or more of the Axis powers were seriously contemplat-
ing use of poisonous or noxious gases or other inhumane devices of warfare. . . . We 
promise to any perpetrators of such crimes full and swift retaliations in kind. . . . Any use 
of gas by any Axis power, therefore, will be followed by the fullest possible retaliation up-
on munition centers, seaports, and other military objectives throughout the whole extent 
of the territory of such Axis country. 
  
Use of Poison Gas, 8 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 507 (1943). 












to individual criminal responsibility. The war crimes against Bosnian Croat 
and Muslim civilians during the Bosnian war of the 1990s could not be 
prosecuted had the alleged perpetrators, such as Radovan Karadžić and 
Ratko Mladić, not been identified and indicted. Third, identification can 
impose reputational costs that are not without consequences. More than 
one prominent American official has escaped formal punishment for the 
mistreatment of prisoners in recent years but endured widespread denunci-
ation because the chain of command was (at least on occasion) transparent 
enough to pinpoint responsibility.  
Sometimes, of course, those costs are light enough or improbable 
enough for a transgressor to absorb painlessly. Muammar Gaddafi flouted 
all legal obligations in his effort to remain in power in Libya, and Syrian 
President Bashar al-Assad, while attempting to exonerate himself of per-
sonal liability, has long seemed undeterred by the possibility of criminal 
prosecution for crimes against his country’s civilians. An effective rule of 
law ultimately relies on making the costs of non-compliance exceed the 
costs of compliance; the history of international law has been a struggle to 
do just that. Anonymity makes violation cost-free, however, because the 
assignment of responsibility and imposition of penalties are impossible. 
Attributability, in contrast, creates reciprocity-induced restraints. It produc-
es greater regularity in conflict management, enhanced predictability in in-
ter-State relations and increased systemic stability. 
How, then, do the conditions needed for effective international rules 
affect the amenability of cyber operations to international regulation of 
cyber weapons and cyber attacks?  Cyber operations’ “attribution prob-
lem,”64 so-called, in reality exists at three levels. To attribute a cyber attack 
to a State, it’s necessary to establish what computer was used, who was sit-
ting at the computer (if it’s not government-owned), and what government 
or organization that person worked for. Sophisticated cyber attacks of the 
sort launched by governments normally are extremely difficult to trace at 
any of those levels. Most experts believe that the possibility of concealment 
is baked into the structure of the Internet and cannot feasibly be eliminat-
                                                                                                                      
64. See Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW 
JOURNAL 373, 397–408 (2011). For an excellent review of the technological difficulties 
involved in attribution with regard to cyber operations, see also JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA 
THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE THE NEW THREAT MATRIX OF DIGITAL ESPIONAGE, CRIME, 
AND WARFARE 50–51, 133–34, 234–35 (2011); David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untan-













ed.65 Circumstantial evidence and inferred motives have led experts to sus-
pect State involvement in a number of cyber attacks over recent years, but 
have not provided the level of probability long thought necessary to justify 
military retaliation. 
It remains likely, therefore, that the law of war, compliance with which 
depends heavily upon attributability and related background conditions, 
will not be refined to further regulate cyber operations. 
The possibility of further regulation cannot be dismissed, however, par-
ticularly after the New York Times confirmed that the United States and Is-
rael were behind Stuxnet.66 Policymakers cannot automatically assume de-
niability, for secrecy is not the only incentive that drives States. Policymak-
ers confront a dilemma: they seek secrecy, of course, for all the reasons 
that plausible deniability is sought in covert operations; “[n]on-attribution 
to the United States for covert operations,” the Church Committee found, 
“was the original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of ‘plausi-
ble denial.’”67 But policymakers at the same time want the world―and often 
need the world―to know of their successes. They are credit-seeking, 
blame-avoiding actors. They seek praise for what they do. They don’t want 
to be found at fault if the public in the fullness of time learns that war 
might have been avoided through the discrete use of some amazing new 
application like Stuxnet. They want to make their political leaders look 
tough, their software designers look smart and their nation’s adversaries 
look twice before attacking. All this requires public disclosure―leaks.68 At-
tribution, therefore, cannot be masked entirely by computer technology, 
even if the Internet does remain opaque. No “HAL 9000” runs the 
                                                                                                                      
65. See Clark & Landau, supra note 64, at 531 (“The Internet was not designed with 
the goal of deterrence in mind. . . .”); see also Susan W. Brenner, “At Light Speed”: Attribution 
and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare, 97 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMI-
NOLOGY 379 (2007) (discussing how computing technology complicates attribution); W. 
Earl Boerbert, A Survey of Challenges in Attribution, in COMMITTEE ON DETERRING 
CYBERATTACKS, supra note 60, at 41, 41–52, available at http://www.nap.edu/openbook. 
php?record_id=12997&page=41 (outlining the barriers to both technological and human 
attribution in cyberspace). 
66. See Sanger, supra note 3. 
67. SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT 
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, INTERIM REPORT: ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS IN-
VOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS, S. REP. NO. 94-465, at 11 (1975), available at http://www. 
intelligence.senate.gov/pdfs94th/94465.pdf. 
68. “That’s another of those irregular verbs, isn’t it? I give confidential press briefings; 
you leak; he’s being charged under section 2A of the Official Secrets Act.” Yes, Prime Min-












show―yet―and human involvement is a trapdoor, waiting to be exploited 
by spies and reporters. 
That being true, what lies ahead? The answer depends largely upon the 
course of future events. At one end of the spectrum lies an overt, immedi-
ately attributable cataclysmic cyber shock―a “digital Pearl Harbor” involv-
ing, say, a massive, sustained East Coast power outage in midwinter, break-
ing pipes and disabling ATMs, police communications and air traffic con-
trol systems. In that event, pressure would be brought to bear on the U.S. 
government to take the lead in devising new international rules to prevent a 
recurrence, much as occurred in 1919 at Versailles and 1945 in San Fran-
cisco. At a minimum, new rules could take the form of targeted, universal 
sanctions directed at wrongdoers; at a maximum one could envision an ex-
plicit redefinition of self-defense to permit the use of kinetic force in re-
sponse to a cyber attack.  
At the other end of the spectrum lie “drip-drip” clandestine cyber at-
tacks―an occasional “flash crash” on a stock exchange that no one can ex-
plain, a mysterious airline accident here, a strange power blackout there, 
incidents extending over months or years, with no traceable sponsorship. 
Although the ultimate cost of these attacks could be great, they are likely to 
be tolerated because the costs are incurred gradually and incrementally, be-
cause no sponsor can be quickly identified69 and because the countervailing 
benefits of cyber weapons seem greater by comparison (as with Stuxnet). 
For a financially strapped and war-weary public and an American military 
establishment inclined toward “light footprints,” those are strong reasons 
not to bargain away cyber weapons.  
In this scenario, cyber weapons research is driven not by adversaries’ 
actual capabilities but by the reciprocal assumption that if we can discover 
it, an adversary can also discover it―the classic security dilemma that cre-
ates an inexorable forward momentum. Cyber operations are in this view 
                                                                                                                      
69. As the time required to identify an attacker increases, the likelihood of a forceful 
response decreases. The Libyan bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 is an example. Confirming 
the Libyan government’s involvement took years, during which the aggrieved States relied 
upon law enforcement rather than military remedies. Immediate confirmation might have 
drawn comparisons to the German sinking of the Lusitania in 1915, which contributed 
significantly to U.S. entry into World War I. See Jonathan B. Schwartz, Dealing with a “Rogue 
State”: The Libya Precedent, 101 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553, 555–56 
(2007) (describing how the United States and United Kingdom “elected to treat the bomb-
ing of Pan Am 103 as a crime under their domestic legal processes” rather than “consid-
er[ing] [it] an ‘act of war,’ as the United States had treated the Libyan-sponsored attack on 













regarded as merely the latest efforts―the latest successes―at injecting less risk 
into combat, merely the most recent in a long history of efforts by States to 
fight at a greater distance, to afford greater protection to non-combatants 
(and combatants), to enhance proportionality―in effect, to pursue many of 
the ends of humanitarian law. States in this scenario will continue to seek 
concealment but will recognize that the operation is discoverable and at-
tributable. In the recognition of that risk lies the possibility of some inter-
national legal regulation. But that regulation, if it occurs, will not likely be 
deep or broad, because it will be limited by the same incentive structure 
that drives it: policymakers will continue to seek out rules, here as else-
where, intended to permit what they’re doing but to limit what their adver-
saries might do. So the blades of such rules are likely to be dull, for the au-
thors’ own protection.  
How likely is each of those scenarios? The truth is that only a handful 
of people in the world―if that―are knowledgeable enough to say. I am not 
one of them. It would be a mistake, however, to underestimate the humani-
tarian and institutional costs lurking in the seemingly benign, second sce-
nario of drip-drip attacks and counterattacks. If they have anything in 
common with warriors of the past, cyber warriors will be less inhibited in 
initiating computer-induced violence. Anonymity, and the distance from 
violence that provides it, will afford not only safety and insulation against 
retaliation; distance removes inhibitions against committing acts of vio-
lence. Cyber and drone technologies insert greater separation between 
hunter and victim than ever before: no screams are audible and no blood is 
visible when pain is inflicted thousands of miles away, merely by hitting the 
“enter” button on a keyboard.70 The hunter may not even know whether a 
“kill” has occurred. In a sequence of relentless cyber attacks and counterat-
tacks, the risk assessment of warfighting is carried out behind closed doors, 
in the security of Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities, safely 
                                                                                                                      
70. Joshua Greene’s research has shown that the thought of killing with one’s bare 
hands is more disagreeable than the thought of killing by throwing a switch that kills from 
afar. Primates find screams of pain aversive. See Joshua D. Greene, The Secret Joke of Kant’s 
Soul, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY: EMOTION, BRAIN 
DISORDERS, AND DEVELOPMENT 35, 43 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2008) (“[W]hen 
harmful actions are sufficiently impersonal, they fail to push our emotional buttons, de-
spite their seriousness, and as a result we think about them in a more detached, actuarial 
fashion.”). For the philosophical origins of the “trolley problem,” see Judith Jarvis Thom-
son, The Trolley Problem, 94 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1395 (1985); Philippa Foot, The Problem of 
Abortion and Negative and Positive Duty: A Reply to James LeRoy Smith, 3 JOURNAL OF MEDI-












immune from legislative or public scrutiny. Cyber attacks, as “sources and 
methods,” are kept secret from Congress. No citizenry is aroused to object. 
Indeed, the public doesn’t even know that an attack has been launched. 
Which States or terrorists are behind the attacks are―in the public 
sphere―anyone’s guess. Retaliatory attacks, as well as preventive and 
preemptive attacks, are launched instantaneously, and are thus triggered by 
an adversary’s presumed capability and inferred motives rather than by ac-
tual or apparent provocations. As a result, drip-drip strikes―and something 
very like war―occur more often, in more places, against more targets, 
based upon weaker evidence.  
If that’s the road ahead, gaps or no gaps, we are in for a rough ride. 
 
 
